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Abstract
This paper examines the role of institutions in the nexus between public
spending and economic growth. Empirical results based on a newly assem-
bled dataset of 80 countries over the 1970-2010 period suggest that particu-
larly when institutions prompt governments to be accountable to the general
citizen does public capital spending promote growth. Taking account of the
type of ﬁnancing for this spending, we show that the growth-promoting ef-
fect under an accountable government appears to prevail for various ﬁnancing
sources, including a reallocation from current spending, an increase in rev-
enue, and a rise in the budget deﬁcit. However, government accountability
does not seem to play a key role in the growth eﬀects of current spending.
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1. Introduction
When do public policies have the desired outcomes? For example, suppose
that the government’s objectives are to raise citizens’ education attainment
and reduce mortality rates. Then, would increased education and health
spending always help achieve these objectives? Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008)
suggest that it may not, showing that for those policies to work, they need
to be accompanied by good governance, namely by a government that is ac-
countable for its actions or a bureaucracy with a professional ethos. Further,
suppose that the objective is to control inﬂation rates. Would policy reforms
aimed at increasing central bank independence necessarily help achieve this
objective? Acemoglu et al. (2008) suggest that it may not, arguing that
whether the reform works or not depends on institutions. For example, if in-
cumbent policymakers are unconstrained to pursue personal rents, they may
not properly implement reforms which could jeopardize their own privilege,
resulting in the failure of these reforms.1 Thus, the general message appears
to be that institutions that prompt a government to be accountable to the
general public are critical for policies to yield the desired outcomes.2
Acknowledging this, the present paper examines the impact of institu-
tions, particularly those aﬀecting government accountability to the general
public, on the eﬀectiveness of public spending as a growth-promoting policy.
One strong motivation behind this investigation lies in the lack of consen-
sus in the literature regarding the eﬀects of diﬀerent spending components on
economic growth, as summarized by Gemmell et al. (2013). In particular, al-
though capital spending may be expected to enhance growth by accumulating
public capital and thus promoting private ﬁrms’ productivity, the empirical
results oﬀered thus far are not consistent, even qualitatively. For example,
focusing on developing countries, Gupta et al. (2005) and Bose et al. (2007)
show that capital spending enhances growth, whereas Devarajan et al. (1996)
and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) argue that this spending has a growth-
1Further, they argue that political reform is unlikely to have a signiﬁcant impact when
the quality of political institutions is highest, because in such cases, there should not be
much distortion in existing policies in the ﬁrst place, leaving little room for the reform to
have any impact. Thus, their overall ﬁnding is that the reform has a maximum impact
when implemented in countries where the quality of institutions is intermediate.
2This paper deﬁnes institutions as the rules and organizations of a society that aﬀect
economic incentives of diﬀerent agents and thus shape interactions among them.
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retarding eﬀect.3 Further, the empirical evidence on growth eﬀects of current
spending also appears to be inconclusive. For instance, while Gupta et al.
(2005) show that this spending, particularly on wages, has negative growth
eﬀects, Devarajan et al. (1996) ﬁnd evidence of its positive eﬀects.
However, examining the role of institutions in the growth eﬀects of dif-
ferent spending components entails at least three challenges. First, disaggre-
gated public spending data at the national level is scarce. To address this,
using historical data reported to the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics
(GFS) yearbook, yet reconciling two diﬀerent methodologies present in GFS,
we assemble a new dataset, which oﬀers comparable spending data series in
both current and capital components, at the central government level over the
1970-2010 period. Further, we assemble corresponding data series on total
revenue, and obtain the budget deﬁcit as a diﬀerence between total spending,
a sum of current and capital spending, and total revenue. This means that
our dataset with disaggregated spending items respects the government bud-
get constraint perfectly, enabling us to examine the growth eﬀects of diﬀerent
spending components for diﬀerent ﬁnancing sources.
Second, measuring the extent to which institutions prompt governments
to be accountable to the public is not a straightforward task. To tackle
this, we consider a range of diﬀerent possible proxies. Speciﬁcally, the main
proxies used below are the measures of “constraints on executives”, as a proxy
for existing constraints on politicians, the degree of “democracy/autocracy”,
as a wider measure reﬂecting citizens’ political participation, and the index
of “voice and accountability”, as an aggregate of various elements relating
to citizens’ participation in selecting governments.4 Further, we examine
other possible proxies for government accountability, including “freedom of
the press”, which assesses the degree of both print and broadcast freedom.5
Third, even with the data at hand, which covers 80 countries over the
1970-2010 period in our reference analyses, estimating the role of govern-
ment accountability in the growth eﬀects of public spending entails a few
3Strictly speaking, a few important diﬀerences in these studies, such as the sources of
ﬁnancing capital spending, make it diﬃcult to compare their results. However, the diﬀerent
results, even at the qualitative level, are still indicative of the absence of consensus on the
growth eﬀects of capital spending.
4“Constraints on executives” and “democracy/autocracy”measures are from Polity IV,
while “ voice and accountability” is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).
5This variable is from Freedom House.
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concerns for endogeneity, including ﬁscal variables’ association with busi-
ness cycles. To address this, we base our reference analyses on 8-year non-
overlapping averages, yielding 5 periods per country. Also, we use the Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimation ap-
proach developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991),
and Blundell and Bond (1998), to tackle other endogeneity issues. Further,
robustness checks address the possible reverse causality problem explicitly,
by using a lag structure in ﬁscal variables.
We ﬁnd that institutions that prompt governments to be accountable
to the general public play an important role in the growth eﬀects of capital
spending, but not in the eﬀects of current spending. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of
capital spending under governments with high accountability are signiﬁcantly
larger than the ones under governments with low accountability. We highlight
that it is this type of institutions aﬀecting the vertical relation between a
government and its citizens that plays a role in the capital spending-growth
nexus, not the country’s income level or the type of institutions governing the
horizontal relations between citizens.6 Only under accountable governments,
capital spending appears to promote growth for diﬀerent ﬁnancing methods,
including a reallocation from the current component, a rise in total revenue,
and a rise in the budget deﬁcit. Meanwhile, the growth eﬀects of current
spending do not seem to diﬀer across diﬀerent accountability levels. There is
some indication that this spending fosters growth particularly when ﬁnanced
by revenue, regardless of accountability levels.
We conduct the following robustness tests. First, as mentioned, we tackle
the possible reverse causality issues by considering the lagged eﬀects of ﬁscal
variables. Second, we add various controls, including demographic variables
related to population aging. Third, we base our analyses on various alterna-
tive datasets, for example, by changing the way the entire sample period is
divided (from the 8-year averages). Fourth, we disaggregate current spend-
ing and total revenues further, particularly highlighting the public wages and
taxes subcomponents, respectively. Last, we consider a speciﬁcation which
exploits the time variations in government accountability levels.
Importantly, while providing extensive evidence for the proposition that
government accountability plays a key role in the public capital spending-
6This way of classifying institutions into the ones governing “vertical” and “horizontal”
relations roughly follows Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), as explained below.
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growth nexus, we do not claim to have proven this proposition. This is ﬁrstly
because the three challenges put forward above cannot be met perfectly: the
disaggregated spending data series assembled, though rendered comparable
across methodologies, is an approximation; the concept of government ac-
countability, for which we use various proxies, is intrinsically diﬃcult to
quantify; and an endogeneity concern, though tackled in various manners,
is likely to remain. Secondly, the association between capital spending and
growth under high accountability becomes weaker, albeit still signiﬁcant,
when apparent outliers are excluded. Thus, our claim is rather that the evi-
dence for the proposition is strong enough to enhance awareness of the role
of accountability in the public spending-growth nexus.
The likely role of government accountability in the growth eﬀects of pub-
lic capital spending is interpreted as follows. While this spending potentially
has a large growth-promoting eﬀect by accumulating public capital and thus
promoting private ﬁrms’ productivity, its positive eﬀect can be critically mit-
igated by ineﬃciencies in capital spending under unaccountable governments.
Speciﬁcally, these ineﬃciencies may arise when unaccountable oﬃceholders
attempt to receive “commissions” by granting private enterprises public cap-
ital projects. For instance, these rent-seeking oﬃceholders may compromise
the quality of contractors or inﬂate the size of projects unnecessarily. Turn-
ing to why government accountability may not play a key role in the current
spending-growth nexus, our view is that even when oﬃceholders are less con-
strained, this spending, often based on explicit entitlements/commitments
(e.g., wages and pensions), provides them with smaller room for discretion
and thus yields smaller eﬃciency loss.
Broadly, our paper highlights the importance of the quality/eﬃciency of
public (particularly capital) spending rather than its quantity. In this re-
gard, this study is related to several papers in the literature discussing the
importance of the former. For instance, Pritchett (2000) emphasizes that not
all actual accounting costs of public investment necessarily contribute to the
creation of economically valuable capital. Subsequently, Dabla-Norris et al.
(2012) create a cross-country index of public investment eﬃciency for 71
countries, considering several aspects of investment management over the
four diﬀerent stages: project appraisal, selection, implementation and evalu-
ation. While their index reﬂects the degree of ineﬃciency relating to govern-
ments’ rent expropriation, its coverage is wider, capturing also the ineﬃciency
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due to their pure inability to conduct an eﬃcient investment management.7
Further, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007) ﬁnd that
the level of capital spending increases in the worsening of corruption and
institutional quality, respectively.8 This suggests the existence of politically-
induced ineﬃciencies inherent in capital spending. This paper complements
the above studies by directly estimating the impact of institutions on the
relationship between public capital spending and economic growth.
This paper is also closely linked to the literature on institutions and their
long-run economic outcomes. In particular, since Hall and Jones (1999) and
Acemoglu et al. (2001) showed the eﬀect of the former on the latter, various
papers examined this relation further. For example, Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) unbundle institutions into “property rights institutions”, which pro-
tect citizens against expropriation by the government and elites, and “con-
tracting institutions”, which facilitate private contracts between citizens, and
show that the worsening of the former type of institutions has larger adverse
eﬀects on growth by discouraging private investment.9 Given that the insti-
tutions we consider, the ones prompting governments to be accountable to
citizens, are essentially property rights institutions, our results add to the
literature by proposing a complementary channel through which this type of
institutions aﬀects growth, i.e., the eﬃciency of public capital spending.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data
and shows key stylized facts. Section 3 sets up the hypotheses to be tested
and discusses empirical speciﬁcation and methodology. Section 4 presents,
interprets, and discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with policy
implications.
7In fact, this way of diﬀerentiating the sources of public policy ineﬃciency is considered
by Bandiera et al. (2009), who deﬁne the “active” and “passive” waste of public policy
as, respectively, a waste involving beneﬁt for policy makers and one caused by simple
inability, lack of incentives, or excessive bureaucracy. While they emphasize the particular
importance of the latter as a source of waste in the case of Italy, this paper highlights the
importance of the former.
8Keefer and Knack (2007) argue that what is correlated with the level of capital spend-
ing is institutions that limit government’s rent seeking, such as competitive elections and
political checks/balances, rather than the level of corruption.
9They explain this result by arguing that while individuals often manage to mitigate the
adverse eﬀects of weak contracting institutions by altering the terms of their contracts,
they ﬁnd it diﬃcult to mitigate states’ expropriation in this way since the state is the
ultimate arbiter of contracts.
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2. Data and Stylized Facts
First, we provide a brief description of key variables, namely, ﬁscal vari-
ables and institutional proxies. We then present stylized facts that motivate
the subsequent econometric analysis.
2.1. Disaggregated public spending and other ﬁscal variables
Facing the limited availability of disaggregated public spending data at
the national level, we assemble a dataset based on the IMF’s Government
Finance Statistics (GFS) yearbook. The key innovation of this dataset is
to bridge major methodological changes in the GFS manual (GFSM), which
happened frommid 1990s to early 2000s due to the replacement of GFSM1986
with GFSM2001. Speciﬁcally, referring to Wickens (2002), who details the
methodological diﬀerences between the two manuals, we create comparable
disaggregated public spending data series, consisting of current and capital
components over the 1970-2010 period. The detailed exposition of the data
assembling procedure is found in the Online Appendix.10 The dataset also
covers the total revenue series spanning the two methodologies. Then, ensur-
ing that data on both capital and current spending items, and total revenue,
are all available in a given year for a country, we obtain the budged deﬁcit
as a diﬀerence between total spending (a sum of current and capital spend-
ing) and total revenue. The level of government covered is the consolidated
central government (CG), supplemented by budgetary CG level data.11 The
analysis is not based on the general government level data, because under
GFSM1986 countries reported data at most at the CG level.
2.2. Institutions aﬀecting government accountability
To select proxies for institutions aﬀecting government accountability, we
assume that political oﬃceholders are less accountable when they are less con-
strained. Based on this assumption, our ﬁrst main proxy is the measure of
“executive constraints” (“constraints”, for short) from Polity IV, measuring
10The Online Appendix is available at: http://www1.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/fjveiga/Papers/EER-D-15-006
11To explain, the consolidated CG level can be divided based on whether the institutional
unit is ﬁnanced by the legislative budget or by extrabudgetary sources. Budgetary CG
is the CG unit based only on the legislative budget, so that the consolidated CG level is
more general. Note that combining data from both CG levels is a common practice in the
literature (e.g., Devarajan et al. (1996)).
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the degree of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of
chief executives.12 Our next proxy is the measure of “democracy/autocracy”
(“democracy”), also from Polity IV, reﬂecting not only the previous measure
of “constraints”, but also other democratic elements including the degree to
which citizens’ political participation is guaranteed.13 We believe that free-
dom of citizens to pursue alternative political preferences clearly constrains
politicians’ irresponsible behavior. The third proxy is the measure of “voice
and accountability” (“voice”), from the World Governance Indicators (WGI).
This variable aggregates various existing measures concerning citizens’ polit-
ical participation and other elements promoting government accountability,
including freedom of the press and the transparency of public policies.
2.3. Stylized facts
Before conducting the econometric analysis, we present simple evidence
indicative of the key role of government accountability in the nexus between
public spending and growth. Fig.1 plots the share of capital spending in
total spending against the growth rate of real GDP per capita, for coun-
tries with high and low government accountability.14 Consistent with the
reference regressions below (Table 3), the total of 80 countries are classiﬁed
by accountability using the median of the national averages of “constraints”
over the 1970-2010 period as a threshold. The share of capital spending is a
non-overlapping average over 8 years (as in the regression analysis).
The solid OLS ﬁtted line in the left subﬁgure shows that, under high
accountability, the association between the share of capital spending in total
spending and GDP per capita growth is positive and signiﬁcant (at the 1
percent level). However, the dashed line shows that when we exclude three
observations for Botswana which appear to be outliers, located in the north-
eastern part of the subﬁgure, the association weakens noticeably, although
the positive relation still remains statistically signiﬁcant.15 Turning to the
low-accountability group, however, the ﬁtted line does not exhibit any sig-
12The variable name in Polity IV is “XCONST”.
13The name of this measure in Polity IV is “POLITY2”. We also consider Vreeland
(2008)’s XPOLITY correction, to address the criticism that the anocracy part (values
close to zero) of POLITY2 does not capture elements of political institutions.
14The data sources are found in the Online Appendix.
15Even when standard errors are clustered by country, the positive and signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcients of capital spending under high accountability stand with or without Botswana.
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Figure 1: Growth rates and public capital spending as a share of total spending
niﬁcant relation. Thus, a higher capital spending share, corresponding to
a lower current spending share, is associated with higher growth only un-
der accountable governments. This suggests that institutions play a role in
the public spending-growth nexus, albeit with a caveat on the potentially
important eﬀect of outliers.
3. Econometric Analysis
This section sets up the main hypotheses to be tested econometrically,
presents summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions, and ex-
plains the empirical model and estimation method.
3.1. Main testable hypotheses
• Government accountability matters in the public spending-growth nexus.
This is motivated by the stylized facts suggesting that public capi-
tal spending may be particularly growth-enhancing under governments
with high accountability. This is also consistent with the previous
9
studies surveyed in the introduction, which indicate that the quality of
institutions is positively associated with public investment eﬃciency.
• The type of ﬁnancing for public spending matters for economic growth.
This is based on the observation from various studies (detailed below)
that diﬀerent ﬁscal variables, including revenue and the budget deﬁcit,
aﬀect growth diﬀerently. Testing this is important, since it helps iden-
tify the ﬁnancing methods with which public spending fosters growth.
3.2. Summary statistics
We test the hypotheses conducting panel regression analyses. Our refer-
ence speciﬁcation adopts 8-year non-overlapping averages, creating a max-
imum of 5 observations per country (i.e., 1971–78, 1979–1986, . . . , 2003–
2010). The purpose of taking this measure is two-fold. First, we attempt to
abstract from the eﬀects of business cycles on ﬁscal variables. Second, this
measure helps address the possible delayed growth eﬀects of public spending.
Note also that since our disaggregated annual ﬁscal data are unbalanced, we
need to choose when we calculate each 8-year average. In our main analysis,
we take the period average of ﬁscal variables only if at least 3 observations
are available within each 8-year period.16
Table 1 describes the dataset using the 8-year averages, based on 228 ob-
servations from 80 countries corresponding to the reference regression equa-
tions (Table 3). The average growth rate of GDP per capita is 17.5 percent
over the 8 years, corresponding to an annual growth rate of above 2 percent.
Turning to the ﬁscal variables, the share of total spending to GDP is about
29.7 percent on average, decomposed into current and capital spending shares
of 27.2 and 2.5 percent, respectively. Further, with the average total revenue
of 27.7 percent, the total deﬁcit is 2 percent. Last, the other explanatory vari-
ables, whose rationale is commented below, include initial GDP, initial level
of schooling, private investment (relative to GDP), and population growth
rates. The data sources are found in the Online Appendix.
To examine the role of government accountability in the public spending-
growth nexus, the reference econometric analysis classiﬁes countries into ones
with high- and low-accountability, using the median of the national averages
16Robustness checks below examine diﬀerent threshold values to calculate the period av-
erage. However, in general, a too stringent value critically reduces the number of available
observations, while a too lenient value may not exactly reﬂect the actual average.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: 8-year non-overlapping averages
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Growth rate (8 years) 17.5 17.6 -41.3 84.8
Total spend/GDP 29.7 9.4 11.8 54
Capital spend/GDP 2.5 2.2 0.3 13.7
Current spend/GDP 27.2 9.8 11.3 51.5
Total rev/GDP 27.7 9 11.4 48.8
Budget deﬁcit/GDP 2 3.7 -14.1 14.8
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 9 1.1 6 10.9
Initial level of schooling 7 3.2 0.6 13.4
Private investment/GDP 19.9 5.3 3.7 39.6
Population growth 1.4 1.3 -1 9
Note: Statistics are based on 228 observations. The Initial GDP is the log of 2005 US$. Initial level of
schooling years are the average years of schooling of the population aged between 25 and 64. The other
ﬁgures are in percent.
of each accountability proxy over the 1970-2010 period.17 Table A.6 in Ap-
pendix A divides the 80 countries used in Table 3 into 40 countries with
high- and low-accountability for diﬀerent proxies.18 As seen there, while
those classiﬁcations roughly match across the proxies, the match is not per-
fect, suggesting that each proxy may capture diﬀerent institutional aspects.19
3.3. Empirical speciﬁcation
Our empirical speciﬁcation is motivated by neoclassical growth models.
The models generally relate the growth of real GDP per capita to two types
of variables: state and control/environmental (hereafter, denoted as control)
variables. The former variables describe the initial position of the economy,
whereas the latter determine the steady-state level of output (per eﬀective
worker). A key prediction of such models is that when the initial position
of the economy is controlled for, an increase in the steady-state level of out-
17While “constraints” and “democracy” are available for the full sample period, “voice”
becomes available only in 1996. Thus, by using this variable, we implicitly assume that it
tends to be persistent over time.
18To ease the comparisons among diﬀerent accountability proxies, we focus on the coun-
tries for which all the proxies are available.
19The correlations among the diﬀerent proxies in the form of dummy variables (i.e., a
high-accountability dummy takes 1 if classiﬁed as highly accountable, and 0 otherwise)
are 0.9 (0.75, 0.7) between “constraints” and “democracy” (“constraints” and “voice”,
“democracy” and “voice”).
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put leads to a higher per capita growth rate during the (seemingly) long
adjustment period towards the new steady state.20 Based on this prediction,
we examine how public spending variables, treated as control variables, af-
fect the steady state and thus the growth rate, under diﬀerent government
accountability levels and for diﬀerent ﬁnancing methods.
Formally, our empirical speciﬁcation is given as
yi,t − yi,t−x = (α− 1)yi,t−x + βui,t−x + f¯′i,tφ+
n∑
j=1
ηj z¯i,j,t + νi + ξt + i,t. (1)
The left-hand side (LHS), yi,t − yi,t−x, is the diﬀerence in the log of real
GDP per capita between year t and t − x in country i. For our main
analyses based on 8-year non-overlapping averages, we set x = 8 with t =
1978, 1986, ..., 2010, thus yielding 5 observations per country at maximum.21
As the sample covers 80 countries, our panel is characterized as “small T,
large N”. Explanatory variables on the right-hand side (RHS) include ini-
tial real GDP per capita, yi,t−x and initial average years of schooling, ui,t−x,
as state variables. The former is regarded as a convergence variable, while
the latter is a proxy for initial human capital. Next, f¯
′
i,t is a vector of ﬁscal
variables as control variables, all given as average values from year t− x+ 1
to t. Further, motivated by the Solow growth model, z¯i,j,t contains control
variables such as private investment rates and population growth rates, again
as period averages.22 Last, νi represents unobserved country-speciﬁc eﬀects,
and ξt is a time dummy, capturing global shocks.
To elaborate, the vector of ﬁscal variables, f¯
′
i,tφ, is given as
f¯
′
i,tφ =
2∑
j=1
ζHj Hie¯i,j,t+
2∑
j=1
ζLj Lie¯i,j,t+γ
HHir¯i,t+γ
LLir¯i,t+χ
HHid¯i,t+χ
LLid¯i,t.
(2)
In the RHS, Hi is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the aver-
age government accountability level is high in country i, whereas Li, also a
20In neoclassical growth models, the steady-sate growth rate is determined exogenously.
See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) (chapter 12) for an exposition of empirical growth
analysis based on neoclassical growth models.
21The robustness section examines alternative settings.
22In robustness tests, we additionally consider the shares of population below 15 and
above 65 years old, the degree of trade openness, the inﬂation rate, the ratio of credit to
private sector to GDP, black market exchange rates, and ruling political party ideology.
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dummy, equals 1 if the accountability is low (both Hi and Li are constant
over time). These constant dummies interact with all the ﬁscal variables as
a ratio to GDP: e¯i,j,t, the diﬀerent spending components, i.e., capital (j = 1)
and current spending (j = 2); r¯i,t, total revenue; and d¯i,t, overall budget
deﬁcit (i.e., total spending minus total revenue).23
Notice, however, that the government budget constraint indicates
d¯i,t = e¯i,1,t + e¯i,2,t − r¯i,t. (3)
This implies that ﬁscal variables yield exact multicollinearity in Eq.2. Thus,
it is necessary to leave out at least one ﬁscal component to estimate the
model. If, for example, we leave out the budget deﬁcit, d¯i,t, the equation we
estimate becomes:
yi,t − yi,t−x = (α− 1) yi,t−x + βui,t−x +
2∑
j=1
(ζHj + χ
H)Hie¯i,j,t +
2∑
j=1
(ζLj + χ
L)Lie¯i,j,t
+ (γH − χH)Hir¯i,t + (γL − χL)Lir¯i,t +
n∑
j=1
ηj z¯i,j,t + νi + ξt + i,t.
(4)
Coeﬃcients on the remaining ﬁscal variables in Eq.4, estimated separately
for diﬀerent accountability levels, measure the eﬀects of these variables on
growth, particularly when ﬁnanced by a change in the budget deﬁcit, the
omitted ﬁscal variable.24 Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcients on capital and current
spending capture the eﬀects of a rise in the respective spending ﬁnanced by
an equal rise in the deﬁcit. The importance of paying attention to the linear
restriction implied by the government budget constraint in the estimation
of growth eﬀects of ﬁscal variables was emphasized by Kneller et al. (1999).
23This approach of examining the role of institutions using time-invariant dummies
is similar to the one employed by Acemoglu et al. (2008). While this approach can be
justiﬁed by the general lack of time variations in institutional variables, we check the
robustness of results by utilizing their time variations.
24In interaction models with two exclusive discrete dummies such as Eq.4, it is generally
necessary to include one of the interaction dummy variables as a separate explanatory
variable to diﬀerentiate the intercepts across groups (see Brambor et al. (2006), p.69).
However, in our panel regression with ﬁxed eﬀects, those time-invariant dummies are
collinear with them, so that it is not possible to add one of the dummies as an explanatory
variable.
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Below, we leave out ﬁscal variables from Eq.2 alternately, to test if ﬁnancing
methods matter in the growth eﬀects of public spending.
3.4. Estimation strategy
We estimate this dynamic panel data model using a GMM approach.25
There are various reasons for this choice. First, the framework is ﬂexible
enough to accommodate our unbalanced panel. Second, it allows us to han-
dle country ﬁxed eﬀects.26 Third, most notably, it enables us to tackle the
potential endogeneity of all ﬁscal variables through the use of internal in-
struments, i.e., instruments based on lagged values of those variables.27 This
is important, because endogeneity issues of ﬁscal and institution proxies ap-
pear to be a non-trivial concern. For example, even if a positive correlation
is observed between capital spending and growth, this does not necessarily
imply that a higher level of such spending causes higher growth. Causality
could in fact be reverse.
While the GMM approach yields consistent estimators, the original “dif-
ference” GMM estimators developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond
(1991) may suﬀer from ﬁnite sample biases. These biases arise particularly
when time series are persistent. In fact, as Bond et al. (2001) point out,
such biases are likely to be large in the context of empirical growth mod-
els, because output tends to be largely persistent. Therefore, we below use
the alternative “system” GMM estimators developed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which augment the diﬀerence estima-
tor by combining the regression in diﬀerences with the regression in levels in
a system where the two equations are separately instrumented.28
25Fixed eﬀects estimators are not suitable, because the time dimension of our sample is
not long enough to make the dynamic panel bias insigniﬁcant.
26To handle ﬁxed eﬀects in our unbalanced panel, following Roodman (2009a), we trans-
form variables through ‘orthogonal deviations’ (Arellano and Bover (1995)), rather than
ﬁrst diﬀerencing.
27Biørn and Klette (1999), for instance, advocate the use of GMM estimator to tackle
endogeneity.
28Papers using system GMM estimators in growth regressions include Bond et al. (2001),
Levine et al. (2000), and Rodrik (2008). Alternatively, some other works on ﬁscal pol-
icy and growth use the Mean-Group (MG) and/or Pooled Mean-Group (PMG) estima-
tors developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999), respectively (e.g.,
Gemmell et al. (2011) and Arnold et al. (2011)). These estimators have their own advan-
tages. Notably, they allow for simultaneous investigation of long-run equilibrium relations
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Speciﬁcally, we treat the state variables of the model, i.e., yi,t−x and ui,t−x
as predetermined variables, while treating the control variables, including
ﬁscal variables, as endogenous. To avoid the problem of instrument prolifer-
ation, we only use one lag as an internal instrument.29 We ensure the validity
of this system approach in our context, by conducting various speciﬁcation
tests. The ﬁrst is the Arellano-Bond test, whose purpose is to examine the
hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated, which is implicitly
assumed in the orthogonality conditions. The second is the Hansen test,
which checks the overall validity of the various instruments of the system.
The third is the diﬀerence-in-Hansen test, which examines the validity of the
diﬀerent sets of instruments used in the level part of the system.
4. Results
First, we examine the public spending-growth nexus without taking ac-
count of institutions. Next, we consider the role of institutions in the nexus.
Last, we check the robustness of the key ﬁndings and provide discussions.
4.1. Without the role of institutions considered
We study here the growth eﬀects of public spending without taking ac-
count of countries’ institutional qualities. The idea is to focus on testing the
hypothesis that ﬁnancing methods of public spending matter for economic
growth. To see why they may matter, consider the growth eﬀect of public
capital spending. This spending, in theory, is expected to have a growth-
promoting potential, by contributing to the accumulation of public capi-
tal and thus raising the productivity of private ﬁrms (Turnovsky and Fisher
(1995) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997)). However, diﬀerent types of ﬁ-
nancing for this spending, including a fall in current spending, a rise in rev-
and short-run adjustment processes, with key parameters allowed to be heterogeneous (in
the case of PMG, the heterogeneity is assumed only in the short-run coeﬃcients), while the
GMM approach only considers the long-run relation and does not allow for heterogeneity
other than the intercept. However, one potential downside of these alternative approaches
is that because the use of annual data is often required (to have a large number of time
series observations), the eﬀect of business cycles can be more problematic than in our
8-year average framework. In addition, the fact that our disaggregated ﬁscal dataset is
unbalanced practically prohibits us from using either of these alternative estimators.
29The key issue, as explained by Roodman (2009b), is that having “too many” instru-
ments weakens the Hansen test of instruments’ joint validity (mentioned below).
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enue, and a rise in the budget deﬁcit, are likely to aﬀect growth diﬀerently,
leading to diﬀerent ﬁnal eﬀects of public capital spending on growth.
First, how may a fall in current spending aﬀect growth? Although the
diverse economic characteristics of current spending make it less straight-
forward to discern its overall eﬀect, certain items, such as operations and
maintenance (O&M) spending and wage payments in public education, may
have distinct growth-promoting eﬀects, by helping retain the functioning
of public capital (Rioja (2003) and Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004)) and
fostering the accumulation of human capital (Glomm and Ravikumar (1997)
and Blankenau and Simpson (2004)). Thus, although other current items
such as social beneﬁts may not be productive, current spending, in total,
may still have a growth-fostering eﬀect, implying that its fall may lower
growth.30
A rise in revenue, another possible ﬁnancing source, may also negatively
aﬀect growth, as taxes are often distortionary. For instance, corporate in-
come taxes, often shown to be particularly distortionary, are expected to
discourage ﬁrms’ investment in productivity improvements and capital ac-
cumulation, and also have an adverse eﬀect on foreign investment and en-
trepreneurship (Arnold et al. (2011) and Djankov et al. (2010)). Further, a
rise in budget deﬁcits can also have negative eﬀects through various channels:
by reducing capital accumulation and productivity growth; by undermining
responsible decision making in spending and thus creating economic waste;
and by generating more public debt and reducing ﬁscal ﬂexibility as a result
(Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), Fischer (1993), and Feldstein (1995)).
To note, while it thus appears reasonable to hypothesize that ﬁnancing
methods of public spending items may matter, conjecturing how they matter
(i.e., how the growth eﬀects of spending may diﬀer across ﬁnancing methods)
is not straightforward. To illustrate, while a rise in capital spending may pro-
mote growth on its own, each of the diﬀerent ﬁnancing methods can have
an oﬀsetting eﬀect, making it diﬃcult to infer a priori which of the oppos-
ing eﬀects dominates. Acknowledging this diﬃculty, however, our tentative
conjecture is that deﬁcit ﬁnanced-spending has the least growth-promoting
potential: when persistent deﬁcits go on too long or become too large, they
may lead to sovereign debt crises, which are generally followed by sharp falls
30Social beneﬁts such as pension payments may actually reduce growth, by discouraging
physical capital accumulation (Feldstein (1974) and Docquier and Paddison (2003)).
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in output.31
Having motivated the hypothesis on ﬁnancing methods, Table 2 presents
the results.32 As indicated, due to the linear restriction implied by the govern-
ment budget constraint (Eq.3), the coeﬃcients of spending variables capture
their growth eﬀects, when ﬁnanced by an omitted ﬁscal variable, an implicit
ﬁnancing factor. Columns (1) and (2), omitting total revenue and the overall
deﬁcit (both relative to GDP) from the respective regression equations, show
the growth eﬀect of total spending, when it is ﬁnanced by a rise in these
ﬁscal variables. Columns (3) to (5) indicate the eﬀects of capital and current
spending components separately, for diﬀerent ﬁnancing sources.
Column (1) shows that a rise in total spending, when ﬁnanced through
revenue, has a positive eﬀect on growth, with statistical signiﬁcance at the 1
percent level. Speciﬁcally, a rise in the ratio of total spending to GDP by 1
percentage point throughout the 8-year period, ﬁnanced by an equal rise in
revenue, leads to a 1.13 percentage points increase in the growth rate over
the period, corresponding to an annual rise by about 0.14 percentage points.
Meanwhile, Column (2) reveals that higher total spending has an insigniﬁ-
cant eﬀect on growth when ﬁnanced by higher budget deﬁcits. Further, the
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient on the deﬁcit in Column (1) shows that a
rise in the deﬁcit, matched by a fall in revenue (keeping expenditure con-
stant), reduces growth. This implies that tax cuts, which tend to stimulate
the economy in the short run, may be detrimental to long-run growth when
they lead to higher budget deﬁcits. The coeﬃcient on revenue in Column (2)
is of identical magnitude with the opposite sign, because a rise in revenue,
corresponding to a fall in the deﬁcit, has exactly the opposite eﬀect.
Column (3) shows that the eﬀect of capital spending, when ﬁnanced by a
fall in current spending, is insigniﬁcant, albeit the sign is positive. This im-
plies that, when the role of institutions is ignored, the growth eﬀects of both
31See Eichengreen and Lindert (1992) on the debt crisis of the 1980s in developing coun-
tries, and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) on a variety of crises, including government debt
crises, over the last eight centuries. The recent experiences of European Union coun-
tries such as Greece and Portugal also illustrate how persistent high deﬁcits can result in
sovereign debt crises with large output costs. Even when a crisis is avoided, rising levels
of public debt will increase the costs of borrowing, adversely aﬀecting the private sector,
reducing investment and growth.
32To facilitate comparison with the subsequent regressions where government account-
ability is taken into account, this table only covers observations for which all the account-
ability proxies are available.
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Table 2: Without institutions considered
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth over 8 years
Total spending Total spending decomposed
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total spend/GDP 1.126*** -0.938
(0.337) (0.760)
Cap spend/GDP 2.637 3.435* 1.497
(2.133) (1.976) (2.003)
Cur spend/GDP 0.798** -1.140
(0.356) (0.751)
Revenue/GDP 2.063*** 0.798** 1.938***
(0.610) (0.356) (0.588)
Deﬁcit/GDP -2.063*** -1.140 -1.938***
(0.610) (0.751) (0.588)
Initial GDP p.c. -12.727*** -12.727*** -12.352*** -12.352*** -12.352***
(3.613) (3.613) (3.240) (3.240) (3.240)
Initial Schooling 0.400 0.400 1.288 1.288 1.288
(2.011) (2.011) (1.885) (1.885) (1.885)
Private inv/GDP 2.462*** 2.462*** 2.329*** 2.329*** 2.329***
(0.673) (0.673) (0.630) (0.630) (0.630)
Pop growth -3.788 -3.788 -5.946 -5.946 -5.946
(3.209) (3.209) (3.677) (3.677) (3.677)
Financing source Revenue Deﬁcit Cur spend Revenue Deﬁcit
Observations 228 228 228 228 228
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 80
No. of instruments 45 45 51 51 51
Arellano-Bond AR(1), p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Arellano-Bond AR(2), p-value 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20
Hansen, p-value 0.59 0.59 0.74 0.74 0.74
Diﬀ Hansen 1, p-value 0.53 0.53 0.68 0.68 0.68
Diﬀ Hansen 2, p-value 0.84 0.84 0.31 0.31 0.31
Notes: System GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Constant and time dummies are not
shown for brevity. All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous except for initial GDP p.c. and
initial schooling years, which were treated as predetermined. Orthogonal deviation was used to transform
variables. Only one lag was used as an internal instrument to reduce the number of instruments. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Diﬀ Hansen 1 tests the exogeneity
of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diﬀ Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of
the lagged level of output used as an instrument in the level part.
types of spending are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.33 Next, with revenue as a
33Note that it is diﬃcult to isolate particular current spending components using a wide
cross-country panel dataset. For example, although the GFSM2001 classiﬁcation indicates
that O&M spending and wage payments in the public education sector are a part of “Use
of goods and services” and “Compensation of employees”, respectively, the latter wider
categories are not necessarily good proxies of the former ones, since they include several
other current spending elements.
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ﬁnancing source, both capital and current spending items have signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀects (Column (4)), which suggest that their growth-promoting
eﬀects dominate (possibly) growth-retarding eﬀects of a revenue increase.
Last, Column (5) shows that when the budget deﬁcit is the ﬁnancing source,
both spending items have insigniﬁcant eﬀects, implying that their growth-
promoting eﬀects are oﬀset by the negative eﬀects of the deﬁcit. The sym-
metric nature of the analysis is again observed, as exempliﬁed by the identical
coeﬃcients on revenue in Column (3) and current spending in Column (4).
These estimation results show the relevance of taking the ﬁnancing method
into account. Capital spending does not have a growth-promoting eﬀect when
ﬁnanced by a fall in current spending or a rise in budget deﬁcits, whereas
it has when revenue is the ﬁnancing source. Current spending also seems to
foster growth, particularly when ﬁnanced by a rise in revenue. In the light
of the above discussions on how diﬀerent ﬁscal variables may aﬀect growth,
these results indicate that the apparent growth-promoting eﬀects of capital
and current spending may be strong enough to dominate the possible growth-
reducing eﬀect of a rise in revenue, but not strong enough to dominate the
eﬀect of a rise in the deﬁcit. This is in line with our prior that the budget
deﬁcit is potentially the most growth-retarding of the ﬁnancing sources.34
Commenting on the other explanatory variables of the regressions of Ta-
ble 2, the coeﬃcient on the initial GDP per capita (expressed in percent)
is signiﬁcantly negative, being consistent with the conditional convergence
hypothesis. The convergence rates between 12 and 13 percent (over the 8
years) imply annual average convergence rates of about 1.5 percent. The
years of schooling, a proxy for initial human capital, has a positive, albeit
insigniﬁcant, eﬀect. Further, as suggested by the Solow model, the ratio of
private investment to GDP has a positive eﬀect, while the population growth
rate has a negative eﬀect, although the latter is insigniﬁcant. Finally, the
diagnostic tests support the use of system GMM estimators, indicating the
absence of serial correlation of the error term (Arellano-Bond, AR(2)) and
validating the internal instruments in the system as a whole (Hansen test)
and their subsets in the level part of the system (Diﬀerence Hansen tests).
34The seemingly weak growth-reducing eﬀect of total revenue is probably due to some
of the less distortionary components. For example, Arnold et al. (2011) rank property
and consumption taxes as less distortionary than personal income, and corporate income,
taxes.
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4.2. The role of institutions
4.2.1. Institutions aﬀecting government accountability
We now test the hypothesis on the role of institutions in the public
spending-growth nexus. Our focus is on the interaction terms between spend-
ing variables and government accountability levels of each country. We ﬁrst
examine “constraints” and “voice” as accountability proxies.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 indicate that capital spending, when
ﬁnanced through a fall in current spending, has a signiﬁcantly positive ef-
fect under high accountability (accountable, for short) governments for both
“constraints” and “voice”, whereas under low accountability (unaccountable)
governments, it does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect for either proxy. This seem-
ingly distinct role of government accountability is supported by the fact that
a Wald test rejects the equality of the estimated coeﬃcients on capital spend-
ing across accountability levels for both proxies, with the p-values of 0.05 and
0.07. The eﬀect under accountable governments appears to be economically
signiﬁcant: a percentage point rise in the ratio of capital spending to GDP,
oﬀset by an equal fall in current spending, raises the annual growth rate by
almost 1 percentage point, corresponding to a 7.06 percentage points rise over
the 8-years period (in the case of “constraints”).35 Next, while Columns (3)
and (4) show that capital spending, ﬁnanced by revenue, promotes growth
in both accountability groups, a Wald test suggests that the coeﬃcients on
this spending are again signiﬁcantly larger under accountable governments.
Last, Columns (5) and (6) reveal that under accountable governments, even
a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced rise in capital spending fosters growth, with signiﬁcantly
larger coeﬃcients than the ones under unaccountable governments.
However, government accountability appears to play a more limited role
in the current spending-growth nexus. When ﬁnanced through revenue, this
spending enhances growth regardless of the accountability level (Columns
(3) and (4)), while in the cases of deﬁcit-ﬁnancing, it has a negative (albeit
often insigniﬁcant) eﬀect for both accountability levels (Columns (5) and
(6)). Moreover, the Wald tests for these cases reveal that the diﬀerences in
the coeﬃcients are statistically insigniﬁcant, with the p-values ranging from
0.19 to 0.97.
35Notice, however, that 1 percentage point increase in the spending share is substantial,
corresponding to about 40 percent of the initial average share of capital spending to GDP
in the whole sample (see Table 1).
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Table 3: Role of institutions aﬀecting government accountability to citizens
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth over 8 years
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cap spend*Highacc 7.060*** 7.672*** 7.505*** 8.129*** 6.168** 6.870**
(2.308) (2.874) (2.234) (2.786) (2.518) (2.995)
Cap spend*Lowacc 2.488 1.960 3.250** 2.883* 0.728 1.116
(1.668) (1.723) (1.588) (1.607) (1.338) (1.384)
Cur spend*Highacc 0.445* 0.457* -0.892 -0.802
(0.246) (0.270) (0.643) (0.659)
Cur spend*Lowacc 0.762*** 0.923** -1.760** -0.844
(0.286) (0.389) (0.840) (0.997)
Revenue*Highacc 0.445* 0.457* 1.337** 1.259*
(0.246) (0.270) (0.660) (0.661)
Revenue*Lowacc 0.762*** 0.923** 2.522*** 1.767**
(0.286) (0.389) (0.819) (0.876)
Deﬁcit*Highacc -0.892 -0.802 -1.337** -1.259*
(0.643) (0.659) (0.660) (0.661)
Deﬁcit*Lowacc -1.760** -0.844 -2.522*** -1.767**
(0.840) (0.997) (0.819) (0.876)
Initial GDP p.c. -11.110*** -11.128*** -11.110*** -11.128*** -11.110*** -11.128***
(3.184) (3.142) (3.184) (3.142) (3.184) (3.142)
Initial Schooling 1.834 2.371 1.834 2.371 1.834 2.371
(1.460) (1.468) (1.460) (1.468) (1.460) (1.468)
Private inv/GDP 1.569*** 1.785*** 1.569*** 1.785*** 1.569*** 1.785***
(0.527) (0.506) (0.527) (0.506) (0.527) (0.506)
Pop growth -6.211** -6.077* -6.211** -6.077* -6.211** -6.077*
(2.755) (3.056) (2.755) (3.056) (2.755) (3.056)
Financing source Cur spend Cur spend Revenue Revenue Deﬁcit Deﬁcit
Accountability proxy Const Voice Const Voice Const Voice
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
No. of instruments 69 65 69 65 69 65
Arellano-Bond AR (1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Arellano-Bond AR (2) 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.28
Hansen 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.83
Diﬀ Hansen 1 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.77
Diﬀ Hansen 2 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.91
Wald, Cap spend, p-value 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04
Wald, Cur spend, p-value 0.21 0.19 0.41 0.97
Wald, Revenue, p-value 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.61
Wald, Deﬁcit, p-value 0.41 0.97 0.25 0.61
Notes: System GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Constant and time dummies are not
shown for brevity. All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous except for initial GDP p.c. and
initial schooling years, which were treated as predetermined. Orthogonal deviation was used to transform
variables. Only one lag was used as an internal instrument to reduce the number of instruments. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Diﬀ Hansen 1 tests the exogeneity
of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diﬀ Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of
the lagged level of output used as an instrument in the level part. Wald, Cap spend (Cur spend, Revenue,
Deﬁcit) tests the equality of coeﬃcients on capital spending (current spending, revenue, deﬁcit) across
diﬀerent accountability levels.
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Thus, institutions aﬀecting government accountability appear to play a
key role particularly in the capital spending-growth nexus. However, what
is the economic reasoning behind this result? At ﬁrst glance, it may seem
puzzling that public capital spending fails to promote growth under unac-
countable governments, as public investment has substantial growth potential
through the accumulation of public capital and thus the promotion of private
ﬁrms’ productivity. Our response, closely based on the insightful discussions
by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007), is as follows.
To begin with, there tends to be large room for discretion by politicians
in capital spending: they often can decide, not only the overall size of this
spending item, but also its timing and allocations. This discretionary nature
provides oﬃcials with considerable rent-seeking opportunities, often in the
form of commissions from private enterprises attempting to secure contracts
for capital projects.36 Then, when politicians are unconstrained, the quality
of ﬁnal capital goods can be compromised for various reasons: contractors
of low-ability/eﬃciency may be chosen in the ﬁrst place; the project itself
may be unnecessarily inﬂated to create more rents; contractors may skimp on
the quality of projects to incorporate commissions. Overall, these politically-
induced ineﬃciencies under unaccountable governments are likely to mitigate
the innate growth-promoting eﬀects of capital spending.
However, why does government accountability not play a key role in the
current spending-growth nexus? Our interpretation is that, unlike capital
spending, this type of spending tends to leave only small room for discretion
by oﬃcials, because it is often governed by explicit entitlements/commitments
(e.g., wages, pensions, and interest payments on the public debt). This char-
acteristic is likely to make the rent-seeking induced ineﬃciencies less distinct.
Besides, Table 3 still illustrates the relevance of the ﬁnancing method.
First, while capital spending seems to promote growth under high account-
ability for all ﬁnancing sources, the lowest estimated coeﬃcients are obtained
when the ﬁnancing source is the budget deﬁcit, and the highest when it is rev-
enue. Second, current spending appears to foster growth only when funded
by revenue, regardless of government accountability levels.
To ﬁnish commenting on Table 3, Columns (3) and (4) (and Columns
36This opportunity for rent seeking usually prevails because, even when such payment,
often synonymous to bribes, is illegal, the complex nature of the design/contracts of capital
projects makes it hard to detect.
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(5) and (6), due to the symmetric nature of the analysis) show that a rise
in the deﬁcits, matched by a fall in revenue, reduces growth regardless of
the accountability levels, with the Wald tests suggesting that the eﬀects
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across them. Regarding the coeﬃcients on
the non-ﬁscal variables, results are in line with the ones in Table 2, except
that population growth rates now have signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects. All the
diagnostic tests again support the use of system GMM estimators.
4.2.2. Institutions, or income levels?
Although government accountability appears to matter in the public capi-
tal spending-growth nexus, because high-income countries tend to have more
accountable governments, the result may simply reﬂect the diﬀerent growth
eﬀects of this spending across diﬀerent income levels. To explore this possi-
bility, we ﬁrst classify countries into high- and low-income countries (HICs
and LICs for short), based on the PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita over the
1970-2010 period.37 Then, making high- (and low-) income country dummies,
which take 1 if a country is from HICs (LICs) and 0 if LICs (HICs), we fur-
ther multiply them with high- and low-government accountability dummies
for capital spending components. With this double-interaction approach, we
examine if income levels themselves play a signiﬁcant role.
The results are summarized in Table 4, which only shows coeﬃcients on
ﬁscal variables for brevity.38 The ﬁrst and second rows show that, for coun-
tries with accountable governments, capital spending tends to foster growth
regardless of its income level, supported by the high p-values fromWald tests
for the respective coeﬃcients (0.79 and 0.98 for each proxy). A similar ob-
37We classify countries by income as follows. For each year of the entire sample period
(1970-2010), we ﬁrst sort 183 countries available in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
(WEO) according to their GDP per capita level (PPP prices) into three groups: the highest
33rd percentile, between the 33rd and 67th percentiles, and the remaining. Next, counting
the number of times each country appears in those three groups during the sample period,
we classify countries that appear in the top 33rd percentile most frequently as high-income
countries. Likewise, countries that appear between the 33rd and 67th most frequently are
grouped as middle-income countries, and the remaining countries as low-income countries.
This way, income classiﬁcations reﬂect countries’ income levels over the whole sample
period. Last, we combine medium- and low-income countries and re-categorize them as
low-income as opposed to high-income countries, so that the analysis covers a suﬃcient
number of low-income countries.
38The results on the other controls, including initial GDP p.c., are in line with Table 3.
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Table 4: Further interaction with income levels
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth over 8 years
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cap spend*Highinc*Highacc 6.294*** 6.576** 6.539*** 6.910*** 5.344** 5.654**
(2.251) (2.533) (2.210) (2.514) (2.349) (2.569)
Cap spend*Lowinc*Highacc 7.234** 6.667* 7.480** 7.002** 6.285 5.745
(3.591) (3.654) (3.388) (3.439) (3.881) (3.871)
Cap spend*Highinc*Lowacc -0.859 0.322 -0.132 1.095 -2.796 -0.407
(2.634) (2.972) (2.460) (2.750) (2.530) (2.809)
Cap spend*Lowinc*Lowacc 1.777 1.249 2.504* 2.023 -0.160 0.520
(1.351) (1.499) (1.280) (1.416) (1.240) (1.161)
Cur spend*Highacc 0.246 0.335 -0.950 -0.922
(0.318) (0.310) (0.585) (0.632)
Cur spend*Lowacc 0.727** 0.773** -1.937** -0.729
(0.319) (0.371) (0.753) (1.080)
Revenue*Highacc 0.246 0.335 1.195* 1.257*
(0.318) (0.310) (0.669) (0.678)
Revenue*Lowacc 0.727** 0.773** 2.664*** 1.502
(0.319) (0.371) (0.807) (1.070)
Deﬁcit*Highacc -0.950 -0.922 -1.195* -1.257*
(0.585) (0.632) (0.669) (0.678)
Deﬁcit*Lowacc -1.937** -0.729 -2.664*** -1.502
(0.753) (1.080) (0.807) (1.070)
Financing source Cur spend Cur spend Revenue Revenue Deﬁcit Deﬁcit
Accountability proxy Const Voice Const Voice Const Voice
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
No. of instruments 79 75 79 75 79 75
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21
Hansen 0.97 0.90 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.95
Diﬀ Hansen 1 0.98 0.92 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.97
Diﬀ Hansen 2 0.31 0.15 0.37 1.00 0.52 0.31
Wald, Cap spend, Highacc 0.79 0.98 0.79 0.98 0.79 0.98
Wald, Cap spend, Lowacc 0.27 0.72 0.27 0.72 0.27 0.72
Notes: System GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Initial GDP p.c., initial schooling,
private inv/GDP, pop growth, constant and time dummies are not shown for brevity. All explanatory
variables were treated as endogenous except for initial GDP p.c. and initial schooling years, which were
treated as predetermined. Orthogonal deviation was used to transform variables. Only one lag was used
as an internal instrument to reduce the number of instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Diﬀ Hansen 1 tests the exogeneity of the instruments used in the level
part (of the system) as a whole. Diﬀ Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of the lagged level of output used as an
instrument in the level part. Wald, Cap spend, Highacc (Lowacc) tests the equality of coeﬃcients on capital
spending across diﬀerent income levels for countries with accountable (unaccountable) governments.
servation can be made for unaccountable governments with diﬀerent income
levels. Thus, the indication is that income levels themselves appear to have
limited impact on the growth eﬀects of capital spending, as long as the level
of government accountability is controlled for.
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4.2.3. If institutions, does the type of institutions matter?
Next, although institutions aﬀecting government accountability seem to
inﬂuence the growth eﬀects of public capital spending, are they necessarily
the only types of institutions which do that? While the broad nature of insti-
tutions makes it diﬃcult to classify them, one potentially distinct type of in-
stitutions is the “contracting institutions” deﬁned by Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005), which is primarily about the horizontal relations between regular cit-
izens, through the formalism of law enforcement. This type of institutions
appears to be diﬀerent from the one focused above, which aﬀects the verti-
cal relations between the state and citizens, similar to the “property rights
institutions” deﬁned by the same authors. We now check if “contracting
institutions” also play a role in the eﬀectiveness of capital spending.
As a main proxy for the contracting institutions, we use “legal enforce-
ment of contracts” from the Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report
(EFW), the aggregate of the estimates for the time and money required to
collect a debt through court, whose original source is the World Bank’s Doing
Business database.39 To proceed, we create dummy variables by classifying
countries into ones with high- and low- level of law enforceability with the
median of national averages as a cut-oﬀ, and then let them interact with the
government accountability dummies for the public capital spending compo-
nent.40 Note that the fact that the correlations of this enforceability dummy
with the government accountability dummies are relatively low (0.22 with
“constraints”, and 0.27 with “voice”) implies that they may indeed reﬂect
diﬀerent types of institutions.
Table 5 suggests that institutions aﬀecting the citizen-citizen relations do
not play an important role in the capital spending-growth nexus. Speciﬁcally,
the ﬁrst and second rows indicate that, as long as governments are account-
39One issue of using this measure is that the ﬁgures are available only after 2002 onwards.
Thus, as a complement, we also consider the aggregate measure of regulations in credit
market, labor market, and business environment, also from EFW. This measure, available
from 1970 onwards (yet only intermittently till 2000), reﬂects the extent to which various
regulations may restrict economic interactions among citizens, e.g., through regulations
regarding hiring/ﬁring workers. Being in line with the results based on the main proxy,
we ﬁnd that whether institutions hinder the citizen-citizen relations through excessive
regulations does not play a key role in the capital spending-growth nexus. The detailed
results are available from the authors upon request.
40To be consistent with the previous analyses, we only look at the countries for which
all the government accountability proxies are available, leaving a total of 79 countries.
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Table 5: Further interaction with contracting institutions
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth over 8 years
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cap spend*Highenf*Highacc 5.876** 7.836** 6.235** 8.264** 4.794 6.980*
(2.682) (3.383) (2.641) (3.337) (2.928) (3.593)
Cap spend*Lowenf*Highacc 6.108** 6.323** 6.467*** 6.751** 5.026* 5.467*
(2.533) (3.126) (2.367) (2.953) (2.628) (3.193)
Cap spend*Highenf*Lowacc 1.630 1.445 2.271 2.265 0.096 0.484
(1.764) (2.204) (1.657) (1.960) (1.664) (1.802)
Cap spend*Lowenf*Lowacc 1.927 1.569 2.568 2.389 0.393 0.608
(1.652) (1.709) (1.589) (1.581) (1.397) (1.513)
Cur spend*Highacc 0.359 0.428 -1.082* -0.856
(0.292) (0.314) (0.615) (0.655)
Cur spend*Lowacc 0.642** 0.820* -1.534** -0.960
(0.301) (0.436) (0.757) (0.990)
Revenue*Highacc 0.359 0.428 1.441** 1.284**
(0.292) (0.314) (0.619) (0.612)
Revenue*Lowacc 0.642** 0.820* 2.175*** 1.780**
(0.301) (0.436) (0.743) (0.805)
Deﬁcit*Highacc -1.082* -0.856 -1.441** -1.284**
(0.615) (0.655) (0.619) (0.612)
Deﬁcit*Lowacc -1.534** -0.960 -2.175*** -1.780**
(0.757) (0.990) (0.743) (0.805)
Financing source Cur spend Cur spend Revenue Revenue Deﬁcit Deﬁcit
Accountability proxy Const Voice Const Voice Const Voice
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227
No. of countries 79 79 79 79 79 79
No. of instruments 79 75 79 75 79 75
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.24
Hansen 0.98 0.96 0.91 0.96 0.95 0.99
Diﬀ Hansen 1 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99
Diﬀ Hansen 2 0.45 0.48 0.10 0.36 0.20 0.99
Wald, Cap spend, Highacc 0.92 0.56 0.92 0.56 0.92 0.56
Wald, Cap spend, Lowacc 0.87 0.95 0.87 0.95 0.87 0.95
Notes: System GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Initial GDP p.c., initial schooling,
private inv/GDP, pop growth, constant and time dummies are not shown for brevity. All explanatory
variables were treated as endogenous except for initial GDP p.c. and initial schooling years, which were
treated as predetermined. Orthogonal deviation was used to transform variables. Only one lag was used
as an internal instrument to reduce the number of instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Diﬀ Hansen 1 tests the exogeneity of the instruments used in the
level part (of the system) as a whole. Diﬀ Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of the lagged level of output used
as an instrument in the level part. Wald, Cap spend, Highacc (Lowacc) tests the equality of coeﬃcients
on capital spending across diﬀerent law enforcement levels for countries with accountable (unaccountable)
governments.
able, capital spending tends to have a growth-promoting eﬀect, regardless of
the degree of legal enforcement. Consistently, Wald tests suggest that, for
accountable governments, the diﬀerences in coeﬃcients on capital spending
across diﬀerent degrees of legal enforcement are statistically insigniﬁcant. A
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similar message applies when comparing coeﬃcients across enforcement levels
for unaccountable governments (see the third and fourth rows).
4.3. Robustness of the role of government accountability
We repeated the above exercises (Tables 3, 4, and 5), using “democracy”
as an alternative proxy for institutions aﬀecting government accountability.
Further, acknowledging the criticism that the anocracy part (values close
to zero) of the democracy variable does not capture elements of political
institutions (see Vreeland (2008)), these exercises were also conducted using
Vreeland’s XPOLITY correction. We report that the results based on these
democracy proxies (estimation results are in Tables 2 and 3 of the Online
Appendix) are consistent with the ones based on the other accountability
proxies. In what follows, in relation to the reference regressions of Table 3, we
check the robustness of the results on the role of government accountability
in the public spending-growth nexus, using the three proxies (“constraints”,
“voice”, and “democracy”).
4.3.1. Robustness tests
Modelling lagged ﬁscal eﬀects explicitly. First, we examine an empirical spec-
iﬁcation with an explicit lag structure in ﬁscal variables. Speciﬁcally, instead
of taking the period average of ﬁscal values, we use their initial values in
each 8-year period.41 One advantage of taking this measure, albeit reducing
the sample/observations size, is that the estimation becomes less prone to
reverse causality problems, because it appears less likely that governments’
anticipation of higher future growth rates over the next 8 years prompts them
to spend more, for example, on capital today.
Controlling for additional variables. Second, we control for various additional
variables, to address omitted variable issues. In our context, it may be partic-
ularly worth controlling for demographic variables, because while aging soci-
eties tend to raise social beneﬁts spending, a prominent part of current spend-
ing, they also imply a smaller fraction of the population in the working age
category of 15-65, which can aﬀect growth negatively (Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004)). Accordingly, we add the percentages of the population below 15 and
41For example, if it is the ﬁrst period of 1971-78, we only take the average of the values
in 1970 and 1971, rather than taking the average over the entire 8 years. Accordingly, the
system GMM procedure treats ﬁscal variables as predetermined, rather than endogenous.
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above 65 years old to the reference speciﬁcation.42 Besides, we control for
other commonly-used variables in growth regressions, such as inﬂation rates,
the degree of trade openness, the ratio of credit extended to the private sector
to GDP, and black market exchange rates.43
Assembling datasets in alternative ways. Third, we check the results by as-
sembling datasets in various diﬀerent ways. First, to ensure that the results
are not speciﬁc to the way the sample period is divided, we consider 7-year
averages, starting from 1971 (till 2005) and alternatively, from 1976 (till
2010).44 Second, while the reference analyses take the 8-year period aver-
age with at least 3 annual observations (in view of unbalanced ﬁscal data
series), we here change the threshold value to 4 observations to make each
observation closer to the real (but not observed) average, albeit losing obser-
vations.45 Third, realizing the possibility that the use of central government
(CG) level data may yield a distortion in case of a signiﬁcant decentralization
movement over the sample period, we re-estimate the reference regression (cf.
Table 3) excluding highly-decentralized countries.46 Last, since the analysis
42We assume that these two variables are exogenous, to avoid instrument proliferation.
43Assuming that these variables are endogenous, we add them in turn, rather than
together, again to avoid instrument proliferation. We also examined the ideology of the
ruling political party (left, right, or center) as an additional control. Although similar
results (to adding the other controls) are obtained, its limited availability reduces the
number of observations substantially.
44With this shorter period, the results shown below are based on the lag structure to
address the possibility of delayed ﬁscal eﬀects, although estimations based on the period
averages with at least three observations in each 7 year-period yield similar results. Using
5-year averages, with lagged ﬁscal variables, yields similar results to the 7-year (and 8-
year) cases. However, with 8 periods at maximum in this case, the instrument count tends
to become too high.
45Using the threshold value of 2, instead, gives similar results to the cases with the
thresholds of 4 (and 3), albeit the validity of internal instruments is sometimes lost, with
the Arellano-Bond test implying the existence of serial correlation in the error term. This
may be related to the fact that each 8-year average is too far away from the real average.
46Note that it is not feasible to repeat the analysis using only general-government (GG)
level data, simply due to the severely limited data availability. To order our sample
countries by the degree of decentralization, we calculate the national average of the World
Bank’s ﬁscal decentralization indicators on total spending (indicators based on capital
spending are not available), using all the available, albeit limited, data over our sample
period. The results below are based on estimations excluding the top 5 decentralized
countries within our sample (Guatemala, Uganda, Canada, Colombia, and Denmark).
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is based on the ﬁscal datasets which supplement consolidated CG data with
budgetary CG data, we repeat the estimations using only the consolidated
CG data, to ensure the legitimacy of merging the two types of CG data.
Disaggregating spending and revenue further. Fourth, we examine if the re-
sults depend on the sub-components of current spending and revenue. Al-
though this exercise is often implausible due to the limited availability of
such highly disaggregated data in the original GFS yearbook, we still high-
light public wages and tax revenues, prominent subcomponents of current
spending and total revenues, respectively, by taking advantage of the rela-
tively high availability of these ﬁscal variables.
Exploiting time variations in government accountability. Last, we check if our
main results hold when using a speciﬁcation which exploits the time-variation
of institutional variables. To clarify, our empirical speciﬁcations so far did not
exploit their possible variations over time, since we divided countries into the
ones with high- and low-accountability governments, based on the averages
of the proxies over the sample period. The justiﬁcation for this approach is
the relative lack of time variation in countries’ institutional characteristics,
consistent with the fact that various prior studies on institutions also do not
attempt to exploit their variations.47 Indeed, in the context of our dataset,
strong persistence in the degree of government accountability is generally
conﬁrmed. However, in low-income countries, time variations particularly in
“democracy” appear to be relatively large (not shown for brevity). Thus, we
examine if the alternative approach of using time variations in accountability
levels yields consistent results.
Speciﬁcally, we conduct this robustness test by adjusting Eq.2 to:
f¯
′
i,tφ =
2∑
j=1
ζj e¯i,j,t+
2∑
j=1
κj e¯i,j,ta¯i,t+γr¯i,t+κ3r¯i,ta¯i,t+χd¯i,t+κ4d¯i,ta¯i,t+τ a¯i,t, (5)
e¯i,1,t (e¯i,2,t), r¯i,t, and d¯i,t represent the shares of capital (current) spending, to-
tal revenue, and budget deﬁcit to GDP, respectively, as 8-year period averages
47For example, Keefer and Knack (2007) and Alfaro et al. (2008) use cross-country,
rather than panel, regressions to estimate the role of institutions in the level of public
capital spending and in capital ﬂows, respectively. Although Acemoglu et al. (2008) use
panel regressions to examine the role of institutions in the eﬀect of central bank indepen-
dence on inﬂation rates, they divide the level of institutional qualities based on the entire
period averages, as we do above.
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in country i, while a¯i,t is the accountability proxy, also as period averages.
All the ﬁscal variables are interacted with the accountability proxy, while the
latter is added separately to include all the constitutive terms of the inter-
actions. In this setup, the marginal eﬀect of capital (current) spending on
growth depends on the accountability level: ∂(yi,t−yi,t−8)/∂e¯i,1,t = ζ1+κ1a¯i,t
(∂(yi,t − yi,t−8)/∂e¯i,2,t = ζ2 + κ2a¯i,t). Then, by omitting a ﬁscal component,
we estimate the marginal eﬀect of each type of spending, when it is ﬁnanced
by the particular component omitted, across diﬀerent accountability levels.48
This way, we test the consistency of the results with the previous setup with
time-invariant accountability dummies.
4.3.2. Robustness test results
Tables B.7 and B.8 in Appendix B present summary results for all the ro-
bustness tests except for the last (on time-varying accountability).49,50 Each
cell in these tables shows, under diﬀerent accountability levels and prox-
ies, whether a rise in a respective type of spending, ﬁnanced by diﬀerent
ﬁscal components, promotes/reduces growth, denoted by +/− signs with
star-superscripts for statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. To highlight the role of
accountability, the tables also show the p-values of the Wald tests, examin-
ing the equality of respective coeﬃcients across diﬀerent accountability levels
for each ﬁnancing source, as the averaged values across the diﬀerent prox-
ies. Overall, the p-values suggest that government accountability plays a key
role in the capital spending-growth nexus. This is still largely the case even
when wages (a part of current spending) and taxes (a part of revenue) are
highlighted as ﬁnancing factors (Table B.8). Regarding the eﬀects of cur-
rent spending, however, accountability does not appear to matter, for both
revenue and deﬁcit as ﬁnancing sources. Again, the results indicate that the
ﬁnancing method matters. In particular, while current spending shows a sign
of growth-promoting eﬀects when ﬁnanced by revenue, its eﬀects are always
48For example, when we omit current spending from Eq.5, the estimated marginal eﬀect
of capital spending captures (ζ1−ζ2)+(κ1−κ2)a¯i,t, which is the marginal eﬀect of capital
spending when ﬁnanced by a fall in current spending, as a function of accountability.
49Regarding tests with additional variables, Table B.7 only shows the results with de-
mographic variables for brevity. The key messages remain the same even when the other
additional variables mentioned above are controlled for.
50All the underlying/full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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negative (and sometimes signiﬁcant) when ﬁnanced by the deﬁcit.51
Next, Fig.B.2 in Appendix B shows how the marginal eﬀects of capital
spending, using time-varying accountability, diﬀer across the diﬀerent levels
of accountability, proxied by “constraints” and “democracy”.52 The solid
line in the top-left subﬁgure shows that with “constraints”, the marginal ef-
fect of capital spending, reallocated from current spending, becomes larger as
accountability becomes higher. In fact, the 95% conﬁdence interval (dashed
line) indicates that when the proxy is high, a rise in this spending promotes
growth. Further, the mid-left subﬁgure reveals that with the same proxy,
accountability plays a similar role when the ﬁnancing source is revenue. The
bottom-left subﬁgure shows that in the case of deﬁcit-ﬁnancing, although
the marginal eﬀect becomes larger as accountability rises, the eﬀect remains
insigniﬁcant. However, when allowing for a lag structure of the ﬁscal vari-
ables, the eﬀect becomes signiﬁcant under high accountability (not shown
for brevity).53 Results are similar when “democracy” is used as a proxy (see
right subﬁgures).54 Meanwhile, Fig.B.3 in Appendix B reveals that when
current spending is ﬁnanced by revenue, the eﬀects are much less responsive
to the degree of accountability, and stay largely insigniﬁcant. Next, in the
deﬁcit-ﬁnanced case, the marginal eﬀects still do not appear to be sensitive
to accountability. However, there is evidence of negative growth eﬀects under
high accountability, implying the relevance of the ﬁnancing sources. Overall,
this exercise utilizing time variations in government accountability conveys
similar messages regarding the two hypotheses.
51As a further robustness check, we also considered the possibility that the presence
of transition countries in the sample aﬀects the results. The Online Appendix reports
the results of estimations which exclude 5 ex-Soviet states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Russia, and Ukraine), and these 5 plus other 8 ex-socialist countries (Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). They show
that the inclusion of transition countries hardly alters the key messages.
52Baseline regression results are found in the Online Appendix (Table 4). “Voice” is not
examined, because it is available only since 1996.
53One caveat of considering the lag structure in the current setup, however, is that with
the limited sample (because only initial ﬁscal values in each period are used in estimations),
the number of instruments tends to be higher than the number of countries.
54While “democracy” is originally scaled between -10 (pure autocracies) and 10 (pure
democracies), we here rescale so that it ranges between 0 and 10. The reason for taking this
measure is to avoid the situation in which the interaction term between budget deﬁcits
and this proxy becomes positive as a product of budget surplus and autocracies (both
taking a negative value), as in the product of budget deﬁcit and democracies.
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4.4. Discussions
4.4.1. Does public spending crowd out/in private investment?
Our results thus far, controlling for private investment rates, were based
on the implicit presumption that there is no signiﬁcant interaction between
public spending and private investment. However, if, for instance, public cap-
ital spending crowds out private investment under accountable governments,
the observed positive eﬀects of this spending on growth can be undermined,
because private investment itself appears to foster growth on its own. Fur-
ther, if current spending crowds in private investment, this spending may
actually promote growth, casting a doubt on the above results.
Acknowledging these possibilities, we examine how private investment
may be associated with public spending components for diﬀerent levels of
accountability. Speciﬁcally, to be compatible with our main speciﬁcation
above (Eq.1), we consider the following equation:
i¯i,t = (α− 1)yi,t−x + βui,t−x + f¯′i,tφ+
n∑
j=1
ηj z¯i,j,t + νi + ξt + i,t, (6)
where t = 1978, 1986, ..., 2010 and x = 8. On the LHS, i¯i,t is the ratio of
private investment to output between period t − x + 1 and t (as a period
average). On the RHS, yi,t−x and ui,t−x are initial GDP per capita and
schooling years, respectively.55 f¯
′
i,tφ contains the ﬁscal variables, interacted
with the level of accountability (either high or low accountability without
time variations) exactly as in Eq.2. z¯i,j,t includes the set of various controls,
which, following works such as Serve´n (2003) and Cavallo and Daude (2011),
contain the price level of investment, the ratio of credit extended to the
private sector to GDP, and real exchange rate uncertainty.56 νi and ξt capture
country and time speciﬁc eﬀects. We estimate this static linear panel model
by ﬁxed eﬀects.
55Apart from being parallel with Eq.1, there may not be a clear justiﬁcation for including
these variables. However, the key results are not aﬀected by their inclusion/exclusion.
56Real exchange rate uncertainty is calculated based on Serve´n (2003) and
Cavallo and Daude (2011). Speciﬁcally, we measure uncertainty by the conditional vari-
ance of the residuals resulting from estimating a simple GARCH (1, 1) for the variance and
an AR(1) in the conditional mean equation of the real exchange rate (in logs) by country.
For some countries, convergence was only achieved after making slight adjustments to the
model, such as estimating an ARMA(1,1) for the conditional mean instead of an AR(1).
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Focusing on the coeﬃcients on the interaction between spending compo-
nents and accountability levels, Table B.9 in Appendix B suggests that there
is no evidence of a crowding-out eﬀect of capital spending, regardless of the
degree of accountability and of the ﬁnancing sources. Thus, the indication
that capital spending may promote growth only under accountable govern-
ments still stands. Turning to current spending, the table shows that, while
this type of spending may crowd out private investment under accountable
governments (see Columns (3)-(6)), the Wald tests indicate that the eﬀects
do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across accountability levels. Therefore, our re-
sult that accountability does not appear to play a key role in the current
spending-growth nexus is still intact. Similar results for private investment
are obtained even when using “democracy” as accountability proxy. Further,
the results stand to: 1) the inclusion of real interest rates as an additional
control, as in Serve´n (2003), albeit reducing the number of observations; and,
2) the use of a variant of Eq.6 with a lag structure of the ﬁscal variables.
4.4.2. Further consideration of institutional proxies
Realizing the diﬃculty of measuring the degree to which institutions
prompt governments to be accountable to citizens, this paper used three dif-
ferent proxies, namely “constrains on executives”, “democracy/autocracy”
(together with Vreeland’s XPOLITY correction) and “voice and account-
ability”. We here consider a few more potential proxies.
First, one may argue that corruption measures are also relevant proxies
for government accountability. To examine this possibility, we repeated the
exercises using the “corruption” variable from the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), as well as “control of corruption” from WGI. The results are
that these variables do not play a distinct role in the capital spending-growth
nexus. This apparent lack of the role of corruption in the nexus may indicate
that what matters is the institutional features, such as citizens’ political
participation and constraints on politicians, rather than corruption as an
outcome of such features. Interestingly, this is in line with Keefer and Knack
(2007), who ﬁnd that, not the corruption measure itself, but a broad measure
of institutions, is associated with the level of public investment.
Next, we consider the “freedom of the press” index from Freedom House.
Given that this variable, assessing the degree of both print and broadcast
freedom, is already taken into account as one of the several components of
“voice and accountability”, we here highlight the role of this speciﬁc compo-
nent in the nexus. To clarify, high media freedom is particularly associated
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with active political participation by citizens (see Leeson (2008)). In this con-
text, Table 5 in the Online Appendix shows that the higher media freedom
indeed corresponds to the larger growth-promoting eﬀect of capital spending
for all the ﬁnancing sources.57
4.5. Caveats
Lastly, we reiterate that we do not insist on selling the main proposi-
tion that government accountability plays a key role in the public capital
spending-growth nexus. As clariﬁed in the introduction, we openly admit
the diﬃculty of addressing the proposition. Also, we recognize that there
is evidence weakening our proposition. One example, hinted in the stylized
facts, is the possible importance of outliers. Concretely, the scatter plot in
Fig.1 suggests that when Botswana is excluded from the sample, the posi-
tive association between public capital spending and growth becomes weaker,
albeit still statistically signiﬁcant.58 Besides, despite of the overall indica-
tion from the diﬀerent robustness tests (Tables B.7 and B.8 in Appendix B),
there are a few cases in which the Wald tests do not reject the equality of the
estimated coeﬃcients on public capital spending across accountability levels.
5. Conclusion
This paper examines the role of institutions in the nexus between pub-
lic spending and economic growth. The results suggest that institutions
which prompt political oﬃceholders to be accountable to the general public
play an important role in the capital, not current, spending-growth nexus.
Speciﬁcally, to the extent that governments are rendered accountable, cap-
ital spending has signiﬁcant growth-promoting eﬀects, for various ﬁnancing
sources including a reallocation from current spending, an increase in rev-
enue, and a rise in the budget deﬁcit. The paper also highlights the relevance
57Having repeated all the robustness checks in Tables B.7 and B.8, however, we found
that in some tests, this proxy does not diﬀerentiate the growth eﬀects of capital spending
as sharply as the three main proxies. This may be because not only citizens’ political
participation, but also other democratic features, such as transparency in policy-making
processes, help reﬂect government accountability better.
58Table 14 of the Online Appendix shows that when the reference analysis (Table 3)
is repeated without Botswana, the growth eﬀects of capital spending across diﬀerent ac-
countability levels are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, though its positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects
are still observed under accountable governments.
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of taking the ﬁnancing method of public spending into account. Notably, cur-
rent spending shows a growth-fostering potential when the ﬁnancing source
is revenue, but not when it is the deﬁcit, irrespective of accountability levels.
The main implication of the results is thus that policies or reforms which
reinforce “property rights” institutions, and thus reduce room for oﬃcials’
rent seeking, may help promote growth, by enhancing public investment ef-
ﬁciency. While reforms such as strengthening political checks and balances
and ensuring citizens’ political participation will certainly help, such funda-
mental reforms may be diﬃcult and take a long period of time to implement.
Therefore, the question is, which viable and more immediate policies will
have positive eﬀects? We suggest a few measures along the main stages
of public investment management, namely, project appraisal, selection, im-
plementation, and evaluation. In the appraisal stage, an independent peer
review should be encouraged to help ensure the objectivity and quality of
project appraisals; in the project selection stage, key information such as the
external audit reports and contract awards can be disclosed to the public; the
implementation stage should then be accompanied with the comprehensive
expenditure commitment controls; in the evaluation stage, routine evaluation
by the auditor general should become mandatory. Overall, these measures
would help ensure policymakers to be more accountable, and potentially pro-
mote the eﬃciency of public capital spending and thus economic growth.
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Appendix A. Classification of countries by institutions
Table A.6 classiﬁes the 80 countries used in the reference regressions (Ta-
ble 3) into 40 countries with high- (low-) government accountability, based
on the national averages of respective proxies over the 1970-2010 period.
Table A.6: Classiﬁcation of countries by accountability levels
Country Executive constraints Democracy/Autocracy Voice and accountability
Australia High High High
Austria High High High
Bahrain, Kingdom Low Low Low
Belgium High High High
Bolivia Low Low Low
Botswana High High High
Bulgaria Low Low High
Burundi Low Low Low
Cameroon Low Low Low
Canada High High High
Chile Low Low High
Colombia High High Low
Costa Rica High High High
Croatia High Low Low
Cyprus High High High
Czech Republic High High High
Denmark High High High
Egypt Low Low Low
El Salvador Low Low Low
Estonia High High High
Fiji High High Low
Finland High High High
France High High High
Gabon Low Low Low
Germany High High High
Greece High High High
Guatemala Low Low Low
Hungary Low Low High
India High High Low
Indonesia Low Low Low
Iran, I.R. of Low Low Low
Ireland High High High
Israel High High High
Italy High High High
Jamaica High High High
Japan High High High
Jordan Low Low Low
Kenya Low Low Low
Korea, Republic Low Low High
Kuwait Low Low Low
Latvia High High High
Lesotho Low Low Low
Lithuania High High High
Luxembourg High High High
Malawi Low Low Low
Mauritius High High High
–continued on next page
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–continued from previous page
Country Executive constraints Democracy/Autocracy Voice and accountability
Mexico Low Low Low
Mongolia Low Low Low
Morocco Low Low Low
Namibia Low High Low
Netherlands High High High
New Zealand High High High
Norway High High High
Pakistan Low Low Low
Panama Low Low Low
Paraguay Low Low Low
Peru Low Low Low
Philippines Low Low Low
Poland Low Low High
Portugal High High High
Romania Low Low Low
Russian Federation Low Low Low
Singapore Low Low Low
Slovak Republic High High High
Slovenia High High High
South Africa High High High
Spain High High High
Sri Lanka High High Low
Swaziland Low Low Low
Sweden High High High
Tanzania Low Low Low
Thailand Low Low Low
Togo Low Low Low
Tunisia Low Low Low
Uganda Low Low Low
Ukraine Low High Low
United Kingdom High High High
United States High High High
Uruguay High Low High
Zambia Low Low Low
Appendix B. Further results
See Tables B.7 and B.8, Figs.B.2 and B.3, and Table B.9.
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Table B.7: Robustness: lag structure, additional controls, alternative datasets
Financing Spending component
source increased
Using lag structure with 8-year periods
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Current spend +*** +*** +*** − − − 0.01
Revenue +*** +*** +*** − − − 0.00
Budget deﬁcit +*** +*** +*** −** −* + 0.01
Current spending
Revenue + + − +** +* − 0.24
Budget deﬁcit + + − − − + 0.43
Controlling for demographic characteristics
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Current spend +*** +** +*** + + +* 0.15
Revenue +*** +*** +*** +** +* +** 0.13
Budget deﬁcit +** +** +** + + + 0.10
Current spending
Revenue +** +** +** +*** +** +*** 0.68
Budget deﬁcit − − − − − − 0.80
7-year periods, 1976-2010 (1971-2005)
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Current spend +*(+) +**(+**) +*(+) −*(−) −(−) −*(−) 0.01 (0.03)
Revenue +*(+) +**(+**) +*(+*) −*(−) −(−) −*(−) 0.02 (0.02)
Budget deﬁcit +(+) +*(+) +(+) −(−*) −(−) −(−*) 0.08 (0.09)
Current spending
Revenue −(−) −(−) −(−) +(−) +(+) +(−) 0.14 (0.41)
Budget deﬁcit −(−***) −(−***) −(−***) +*(−) +(−) +*(−) 0.15 (0.35)
Using diﬀerent cut-oﬀs to form period averages
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Current spend +*** +** +*** +** +* +** 0.18
Revenue +*** +** +*** +*** +** +** 0.16
Budget deﬁcit +** +** +** + + + 0.10
Current spending
Revenue + + + + + + 0.75
Budget deﬁcit −** −* −* −** − −** 0.53
Notes: For the case with lag structure (additional controls, 7-year periods from 1976 to 2010, 7-year
periods from 1971-2005, diﬀerent cut-oﬀs), results are based on 74 (80, 76, 79, 75) countries covering 189
(228, 217, 194, 207) observations. + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. The underlying estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table B.8: Robustness: alternative datasets (cont.), further disaggregation
Financing Spending component
source increased
Without highly-decentralized countries
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Current spend +*** +*** +*** +* +* +** 0.09
Revenue +*** +*** +*** +** +** +** 0.08
Budget deﬁcit +*** +** +*** + + + 0.04
Current spending
Revenue +* + +** +** +* +** 0.36
Budget deﬁcit − − − −* − −** 0.53
Without budgetary central government data
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Current spend +** +** +** +* + + 0.12
Revenue +*** +** +*** +** + +* 0.12
Budget deﬁcit +** +** +** + − + 0.05
Current spending
Revenue +** +** +** +*** +** +*** 0.47
Budget deﬁcit − − − −** −* −** 0.41
Wages among current spending are highlighted
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Wages +** + +* + + + 0.13
Revenue +*** +** +** + + +* 0.09
Budget deﬁcit +* + +* + + + 0.17
Wages
Revenue + + + + + +* 0.49
Budget deﬁcit − − − + + + 0.31
Total taxes among total revenues are highlighted
Capital spending
High accountability Low accountability Wald, p-value
Const Voice Democ Const Voice Democ Average
Current spend +*** +** +*** + + + 0.04
Taxes +*** +*** +*** + + + 0.02
Budget deﬁcit +** +** +** + + + 0.03
Current spending
Taxes + + + + + + 0.70
Budget deﬁcit − − − − − −* 0.58
Notes: For the case without highly-decentralized countries (without budgetary central government data,
with wages highlighted, with taxes highlighted), results are based on 75 (71, 76, 79) countries covering 217
(209, 209, 222) observations. + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The underlying estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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Note: Solid line represents a marginal effect.
Dashed line represents a 95% confidence interval.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure B.2: Robustness: marginal eﬀects of capital spending on growth
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Figure B.3: Robustness: marginal eﬀects of current spending on growth
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Table B.9: Public spending and private investment
Dependent variable: Ratio of private investment to GDP (8-year averages)
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cap spend*Highacc 0.851 0.427 0.624 0.146 0.632 0.158
(0.850) (0.753) (0.902) (0.784) (0.862) (0.762)
Cap spend*Lowacc 0.451 0.082 0.354 0.235 -0.088 -0.227
(0.408) (0.394) (0.272) (0.250) (0.433) (0.343)
Cur spend*Highacc -0.227** -0.281*** -0.219* -0.268**
(0.109) (0.100) (0.110) (0.116)
Cur spend*Lowacc -0.097 0.154 -0.539 -0.309
(0.225) (0.284) (0.383) (0.402)
Revenue*Highacc -0.227** -0.281*** -0.008 -0.013
(0.109) (0.100) (0.149) (0.151)
Revenue*Lowacc -0.097 0.154 0.443 0.463
(0.225) (0.284) (0.330) (0.308)
Deﬁcit*Highacc -0.219* -0.268** 0.008 0.013
(0.110) (0.116) (0.149) (0.151)
Deﬁcit*Lowacc -0.539 -0.309 -0.443 -0.463
(0.383) (0.402) (0.330) (0.308)
Initial GDP p.c. 1.199 0.898 1.199 0.898 1.199 0.898
(1.678) (1.654) (1.678) (1.654) (1.678) (1.654)
Initial Schooling -0.518 -0.523 -0.518 -0.523 -0.518 -0.523
(0.776) (0.761) (0.776) (0.761) (0.776) (0.761)
Price of investment 0.046 0.440 0.046 0.440 0.046 0.440
(2.371) (2.118) (2.371) (2.118) (2.371) (2.118)
Real ex rate uncertainty -29.014 -33.070* -29.014 -33.070* -29.014 -33.070*
(19.338) (19.629) (19.338) (19.629) (19.338) (19.629)
Private credit -0.119 -0.193 -0.119 -0.193 -0.119 -0.193
(0.678) (0.655) (0.678) (0.655) (0.678) (0.655)
Financing source Cur spend Cur spend Revenue Revenue Deﬁcit Deﬁcit
Accountability proxy Const Voice Const Voice Const Voice
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201
No. of countries 77 77 77 77 77 77
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23
Wald, Cap spend, p-value 0.67 0.67 0.77 0.91 0.46 0.64
Wald, Cur spend, p-value 0.60 0.14 0.41 0.92
Notes: Fixed eﬀects estimations. Constant and time dummies are not shown for brevity. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Only 77 (relative to 80 in Table 3)
countries are covered due to the limitation in the availability of the control variables. Wald, Cap spend
(Cur spend) tests the equality of coeﬃcients on capital (current) spending across diﬀerent accountability
levels.
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